The Indo-Pacific as a zone of Sino-US competition

Talmiz Ahmad

Sino-US rivalry encompasses most aspects of present-day international relations – geopolitical, economic and cultural – and is a ‘cold war’ in the sense that it portends a long-term global competition that is viewed on both sides in zero-sum terms. The roots of this rivalry lie in the economic and military rise of China that has led its leaders to claim a central place in determining the shape and decision-making processes of international institutions, and, over time, reshape the world order that recognises China’s primacy in global affairs.

China’s claim has solid foundations. It is already the world’s premier trading nation and source of investments, has the world’s largest armed forces, and is a major centre of technological achievement. By 2030, it is expected to overtake the US in terms of real GDP and become the largest global economy.

The “Indo-Pacific” is at the heart of this burgeoning competition – it is here where regional states are faced with choices about their position in the global order, an order led by the US, backed by regional allies and other extra-regional powers, or the alternative order headed by China.

There is as yet no consensus among policy-makers about what the “Indo-Pacific” includes: in line with its strategic interests, the US has a relatively limited view, seeing it as made up of the region from the west Pacific up to the western coast of India. India, on the other hand, sees it as stretching from the western coast of the US up to east coast of Africa, the Red Sea and the Gulf.

Competition in the Indo-Pacific

As of now, the principal zone of Sino-US competition is Northeast and Southeast Asia. In this region, the Chinese and US militaries stand face-to-face in contested maritime spaces, backed by contested claims of sovereign control over islands in the region. This standoff mobilises capabilities of both countries in the domains of air and naval power, and, increasingly, space and cyber security.

The US’ principal concerns relating to China’s assertions in the region are:

• Its claim on the Senkaku Islands, in the East China Sea, presently under Japanese control;
• Its claim to sovereign control over Taiwan; and
• Its claims over most of the maritime spaces of the South China Sea (SCS) through the “Nine-Dash line”, backed by its claim that it retains the right to regulate the activities of foreign military forces in the exclusive economic zones (EEZs). This claim is not accepted by the US and is also disputed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei.

In the South China Sea, China has already developed diverse and significant military assets – airfields and radar and missile platforms -- on several islands under its control. These assets are backed by naval, coast guard and maritime militia, so that, taken together, they constitute the largest maritime force in the Indo-Pacific.

While Japan remains firmly embedded in the US security embrace, the ASEAN region is at the heart of ongoing contentions.

ASEAN amidst Sino-US rivalry

At the meeting of G-7 foreign and development ministers in Liverpool in December, at which ASEAN foreign ministers were invited for the first time, the US made a major effort to mobilise Western support. The G-7 ministers discussed China’s “growing regional aggression”, especially in the Indo-Pacific, and stressed their commitment to “maintaining a free and open Indo-Pacific region.” They also discussed China’s human rights violations in Hong and Xinjiang, and the “importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.”

After this, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken left for a week-long visit to three ASEAN nations – Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. Explaining these developments, a State Department official said that President Biden “is committed to elevating US-ASEAN engagement to unprecedented levels”, which includes discussing the president’s newly announced “Indo-Pacific economic framework”.

This framework was announced by Biden at the East Asia Summit in late October when he had said that the US would “explore with partners the development of an Indo-Pacific economic framework” that would focus on trade facilitation, digital trade, supply chain resilience, clean energy, infrastructure development, and workers’ standards.

In his substantial address in Jakarta on 14 December, Blinken spoke of Beijing’s “aggressive actions” from “Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and from the Mekong River to the Pacific Islands”. He asserted that the US “was determined to ensure free