26/11: IAF on standby and yet India paused

By Neena Gopal

In his new book ‘10 Flash  points; 20 Years’, Congress politician Manish Tewari’s stinging attack on Dr Manmohan Singh’s government’s tame response to the 26/11 Mumbai terror attacks by Pakistani terror ists was guaranteed to grab eyeballs.
In playing up this aspect of the book, only days ahead of the 13th anniversary of the attack on November 26, 2008, the passing mention served its primary purpose.

But was the Congress MP right? Did India drag its feet? In doing nothing, did India come across as weak and effete? Should it have executed a Balakot as Prime Minister Narendra Modi did when a suicide bomber of Kashmiri origin – Jaish-e-Mohammed’s Adil Ahmed Dar – rammed his explosive-laden vehicle into a bus in Pulwama that was part of a CRPF convoy, killing 40 CRPF personnel? The finger-pointing and mud-slinging on who was more macho, Modi or Singh, aside, the fact is that unlike 26/11, when the U.S. quietly mounted pressure on Delhi to refrain from a punitive retaliatory strike against the Lashkar e-Taiba terror group, the 2019 Balakot attack saw world leaders from across the spectrum openly back ing Modi as he claimed to have wiped out the Jaish’s terror training camp during the cross-border strike.

Insiders close to develop ments have strenuously maintained that the Indian Air Force had been kept on standby. This was rein forced by then chief of air staff, Air Chief Marshal (retd) Fali Homi Major, who admitted in a number of interviews that the IAF had been readied for a cross border attack within hours of the Mumbai attack.

Even before the Manmohan Singh government had asked, the IAF, as per established pro tocol, had prepared a contin gency plan for a surgical strike, sources said. This was however shot down, sources close to the developments told News Trail, as not only was there pressure from Washington, but also the Singh government erred on the side of caution as they felt an aerial bombardment would spark a full-scale conflagration between the two nuclear armed nations.

In addition, sources revealed that the army chief, instead of agreeing to the IAF’s plan which was in consonance with the country’s anger and calls for retaliatory punishment, asked for more time to prepare plans for an attack. The army, navy and air force would, however, in the 48 hours that followed the Mumbai horror, arrive at a joint plan and push for a retaliatory strike, only to come up against a cabinet that opposed the move. There was a third factor that limited their strike options - unlike the intel that India is now privy to, courtesy its close ties to Israel and the United States, the IAF did not have access to any intel on the exact location of terror camps in POK.
 
The Cabinet Committee on Security had met on November 28, 2008, 48 hours after the ten terrorists arrived by sea and while the full-scale attack on innocent civilians at multiple locations, killing 166 people during a 72 hour siege, was un derway. But neither the prime minister nor senior members of his cabinet were willing to sign off on an attack.
 
In a fascinating book, ‘Spy Stories, Inside the Secret World of R.A.W and I.S.I’, keen Pakistan watchers and authors Adrian Levy and Catherine Scott-Clark give an interest  ing twist to the tale. While the book claims to be a work of fiction, its content is rooted in reality. And truth. In the shadowy world inhabited by spies and their ilk, an Indian spy, monitoring chatter in ‘Pakistan-administered Kash mir’ at a Lashkar-e-Taiba run training centre, stumbles on a conspiracy devised by Lashkar ‘blowhards,’ to train recruits for a marine assault on a major Indian city.
 
Levy and Scott-Clark reveal that reinforcing the Indian spy’s intel was “the C.I.A., which had an undeclared, high value source inside…who sent 18 detailed briefs, including likely targets in Mumbai, the number of attackers, their route, and method, all of which had been passed on to R.A.W –I.B. (Research and Analysis Wing and Intelligence Bureau).”
 
Senior intelligence officers told NT that the 18 briefs would have not given the real picture, and would have got lost in a mountain of intel notes that would have made it impossible to see an attack of this kind, coming. “It would have been non-actionable,” he said.
 

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